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iV

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case

Timothy Gray appeals from the

district court

order revoking his probation.

Statement 0f Facts and Course 0f Proceedings
Pursuant to a plea agreement with the
(R., pp.62-67.)

felony eluding.

The

state,

Gray pled

district court retained jurisdiction (R.,

placed Gray 0n supervised probation (R., pp.96-100).
(R., pp.96-100.)

prescribed

By

Among these conditions was that Gray would be

pp.80-82), and then

subject to the rules ofprobation

by Idaho Department of Correction (“IDOC”) Agreement of Supervision.
the time of the rider review hearing,

Gray moved

t0

and

The court imposed conditions ofprobation.

Gray had already been approved

(E R., p.89, 92.)

probation transferred to Wisconsin, where his family resided.

later,

guilty t0 aggravated battery

(R., p.97.)

t0

have his

At some point

Wisconsin and entered into a supervision agreement With the Wisconsin

Department 0f Corrections.

(State’s Exhibit B.)

On April

22, 2016,

The Wisconsin Department

0f Corrections provided Gray a “Notice 0f Interstate Compact Probable Cause Hearing,” informing

Gray

that his supervising agent

alleged probation Violations.

violated terms

had made a request

t0 the state

(State’s Exhibit H.)

0f Idaho t0 retake him based upon

Speciﬁcally, the notice alleged that

ST 001 and ST 013 of the Wisconsin Rules of

speciﬁed incidents.

Gray

Supervision in the course of two

(Id.)

In the ﬁrst incident, occurring

May

14,

approached the receptionist and asked for a bus

2018, after a group treatment session, Gray

ticket.

(State’s Exhibit C.) After the receptionist

told

him he would have

Gray “loudly

to wait,

“began pacing back [and] forth near reception.”

Gray

that his behavior

program.

(Id.)

(Id.)

A staff member intervened and explained t0

from the treatment group.

result in termination

chair,

completely blank.

10,

that they

would have

and the glass window” screaming

recipient if she

that

E;

t0 investigate,

by phone,

[her] head.” (Id.)

(Id.)

R., p.152 (clearer

messages, which she

selling guns,

later,

Gray

how much

images of text messages».

knew were

the countertop

Gray followed up with another

sent text messages asking the

the guns

he was looking for “some hand guns and or semi automatics When

ﬂ alﬂ

After the

Whom he told that “he would ﬁnd a gun and come

About ﬁve weeks

knew anybody who was

(State’s Exhibit D.)

Gray “began pounding on

he needed his money.

that

individual at the place of employment

would miss

Gray was discharged

2018, Gray went to his employer to pick up his paycheck, Where

he then asserted that there were hours missing from his pay.

see if he

(Id.)

(Id.)

November

employer told him

from the treatment

When the staffmember returned to the group treatment

room, Gray’s relapse plan was found 0n his

Next, 0n

(Id.)

was inappropriate and could

Gray left the building.

wall 0n the receptionist side,” and then

hit [the]

sent t0 Gray’s sister,

I

would

cost,

and

stating

get paid.” (State’s Exhibit

Gray’s mother became aware 0f the text

and contacted Gray’s Wisconsin probation

agent. (State’s Exhibit G.)

On

January 23, 2019, Wisconsin submitted a “Violation Report Requiring Retaking” to

Idaho containing a description of Gray’s conduct.
hearing, probable cause for the

(R.,

pp.105-106.)

At a February

6,

2019

two Violations was found based upon the testimony 0f a Wisconsin

probation and parole agent. (State’s Exhibit F; R., pp.112.)

On
Exhibit A.)

upon

the

February

14,

2019, Idaho ﬁled an “Interstate Compact Report 0f Violation.” (State’s

In the report, the state alleged that

same two

incidents noted above.

Gray committed two probation

(Id.)

However, the

Violations based

state alleged that the

violated speciﬁed terms 0f the Idaho Department of Correction

conduct

(“IDOC”) Agreement of

Supervision (as opposed t0 either the Wisconsin agreement, 0r the terms 0f probation imposed by
the district court at Gray’s rider review hearing

An
Tr.)

The

was conducted on

evidentiary hearing

sole testifying Witness

Gray’s conduct. (6/18/19 Tn,

When he was placed 0n probation).
the alleged Violations.

(Id.)

(E generally 6/18/19

was an IDOC employee who described the Wisconsin accounts of

p. 14,

L.5 — p.32, L21.) Through this witness, the state admitted the

Wisconsin-generated reports 0f Gray’s conduct, and photos of the text messages.
Exhibits C, D, E,

F,

(State’s Exhibit B.)

G.)

The Wisconsin Rules 0f Supervision were

his

also admitted into evidence.

The IDOC Agreement of Supervision was not admitted

generally Exhibits.) Gray

made numerous

(Id; State’s

into evidence.

(m

unsuccessful obj ections and arguments, including that

due process right 0f confrontation was violated, and that he did not have notice of some of the

grounds for Violation asserted by the prosecutor

At the conclusion of the hearing,
Idaho probation. (6/18/19
state failed to

T11,

at the hearing.

(E generally 6/

the district court found that

p.44, L.23

—

Gray violated the terms of his

IDOC Agreement

alleged in the state’s report of Violation because there

was no evidence

purchased, carried, 0r possessed ﬁrearms as prohibited

by

that this

8/ 19 Tr.)

p.46, L.12.) Before that, the court ﬁrst found that the

demonstrate that Gray violated Term 4 0f the

However, the court found

1

conduct did Violate Term

that term.

of Supervision as

that

(Id.,

Gray actually

p.44, Ls. 14-22.)

ST 001 0f the Wisconsin Rules 0f

Supervision, which provided that

Gray must “[a]void

all

conduct which

0r state statute, municipal 0r county ordinances, tribal law or Which

public welfare or [Gray’s] rehabilitation.”

B.)

The court

also found that

(Id.,

p.44, L.23

—

is

is

in Violation

of federal

not in the best interest 0f

p.45, L.16;

ﬂ alﬁ

State’s Exhibit

Gray violated Rule 12 0f the IDOC Agreement of Supervision

alleged in the state’s report 0f Violation, which provided, according to that report, that

as

Gray must

“meaningfully participate in and successfully complete” any treatment or other programs as
directed.

At

(Id.,

p.45, L.17

— p.46, L.12;

ﬂ alﬂ

State’s Exhibit

A,

p.2.)

the conclusion of the disposition hearing, the district court revoked Gray’s probation

and retained

jurisdiction.1

(R.,

pp.163-165; 7/2/19 TL, p.54, L.18

—

p.57, L.10.)

Gray timely

appealed. (R, pp. 1 66-169.)

1

At the conclusion of the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court relinquished jurisdiction.
V. Gray, Teton County District Court Case No. CR-2015-00100.

Mycourts.idaho.gov portal, State

ISSUES
Gray
I.

states the issues

0n appeal

as:

Should the revocation order be reversed, because the State failed t0 carry its
burden 0f proving that Mr. Gray violated a condition of his probation?

II.

Should the revocation order be reversed, because the district court
erroneously revoked Mr. Gray’s probation Without expressly ﬁnding that
Mr. Gray’s probation Violation was “willful”?

III.

Should the order revoking probation be reversed, because the evidence used
t0 support the ﬁnding 0f the Violation was admitted in Violation of Mr.
Gray’s due process right to confront and cross examine adverse witnesses?

(Appellant’s brief, p.8.)

The
1.

state rephrases the issues

Has Gray

failed to

show

0n appeal

as:

that the district court erred in

ﬁnding

that

he violated the terms 0f

his probation?
2.

Has Gray

failed t0

show

that

he lacked adequate notice of the alleged Violation of the

Wisconsin Rules of Supervision?
3.

Does a review of the record demonstrate
by I.C.R. 33G)?

that Gray’s probation Violations

were “willful” as

required
4.

Has Gray failed t0 show that the district court erred in concluding that due process did not
require him to be provided an opportunity t0 cross—examine Witnesses from Wisconsin in
light good cause set forth by the state?

ARGUMENT
I.

Gray Has Failed To Show That The

District

Court Erred In Finding That

Of His
A.

He Violated The Terms

Probation

Introduction

Gray contends

that the district court erred in concluding that

(Appellant’s brief, pp.10-11, 13-16.)

Speciﬁcally,

he violated his probation.

Gray contends the

state failed t0 present

sufﬁcient evidence that the two terms 0f probation which the court found he violated were even a
part of his Idaho probation.

(Id.)

However, While the absence 0f the

IDOC Agreement

Supervision from the evidentiary hearing and the record required the district court to
inferences,

t0

show

B.

it

was not

error to

A “trial

court's factual

ﬁndings in a probation revocation proceeding, including a ﬁnding

been proven, Will be upheld

State V. Rose, 144 Idaho 762, 766, 171 P.3d 253,

488, 490, 835 P.2d 1299, 1301 (1992); State

C.

he violated his probation.

Of Review

that a Violation has

(Ct.

certain

d0 so in the circumstances of this case. Therefore, Gray has failed

that the district court erred in concluding that

Standard

make

0f

V.

if

they are supported by substantial evidence.”

257 (2007)

(citing State V. Russell,

122 Idaho

Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923, 71 P.3d 1065, 1070

App. 2003)).

The

District

Court Correctly Concluded That Gray Violated The Terms

A probationer has

Of His

a protected liberty interest in continuing his probation.

133 Idaho 237, 243, 985 P.2d 117, 123 (1999). Consequently, a court

may

Probation

State V. Blake,

not revoke probation

without a ﬁnding that the probationer violated the terms ofprobation.
P.2d at 123 (citing

m,

133 Idaho

an evidentiary hearing, the

at

243, 985 P.2d

3 14,

766 P.2d 781, 784 (1988));

be based 0n veriﬁed

facts,

ﬂ alﬂ

and the

is

ﬂ

at

765, 985

At

211$ LC. §§ 19-2603; 20-222.

burden 0f providing satisfactory proof 0f a Violation,

state bears the

though proof beyond a reasonable doubt

at 123);

M, 144 Idaho

not required.

LC.

§ 19-2602.

trial court's

I_d.

(citing State V. Kelsey, 115

Idaho 3 1 1

,

The ﬁnding of a probation Violation must

exercise 0f discretion

accurate knowledge of the probationer's behavior. Li. (citing State

V.

must be informed by an

Tracy, 119 Idaho 1027, 1028,

812 P.2d 741, 742 (1991)).
Here, the district court found that Gray violated two terms 0f his Idaho probation:

IDOC Agreement

of Supervision Rule

12,

which required Gray

(1)

to “meaningfully participate in

and successﬁllly complete any treatment, counseling 0r other programs deemed beneﬁcial by the
Court 0r any agent of the Department of Correction” (State’s Exhibit A, p.2); and

(2)

Rule 0f Supervision ST 001, which required Gray

in Violation

t0 “[a]av0id all

federal or state statute, municipal or county ordinances, tribal

conduct which

of

law or Which is not in the best interest

0f the public welfare or [Gray’s] rehabilitation” (State’s Exhibit B,

— p.46,

is

Wisconsin

p.1).

(6/18/19 Tn, p.44, L.23

L.12.)

On

appeal,

Gray contends

that the district court erred in concluding that

he violated his

IDOC Agreement

of Supervision

probation because there was insufﬁcient evidence that either

Rule 12 or Wisconsin Rule of Supervision ST 001 were a part 0f Gray’s Idaho probation.
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-16.)

The

which presumably contained the

state

acknowledges

IDOC Agreement

that the Interstate

Compact Agreement,

0f Supervision and otherwise governed the

transfer

0f Gray’s probation t0 Wisconsin,

evidence as an exhibit
terms 0f the

is

not in the appellate record, and was not admitted into

at the evidentiary hearing.

IDOC Agreement

Therefore, there

0f Supervision submitted

was n0

direct evidence

0f the

at the evidentiary hearing, 0r direct

evidence that Gray’s Idaho probation required him t0 abide by the Wisconsin Rules of Supervision.
Still,

the state asserts that the district could

make

reasonable inferences from the evidence

submitted t0 satisfy the preponderance of evidence standard that the violated terms were a part of

Gray’s Idaho probation.
First, the state

notes that the underlying judgment of conviction Which resulted in Gray

being placed probation stated that Gray’s probation was “subject t0

all

speciﬁed in the Conditions 0f Probation and Department of Corrections
Supervision, which must be obeyed; a copy 0f Which
this reference. .”
.

clerk’s record,

it

(R., p.97.)

Between

(2015).

this

of the

attached hereto and

Thus, While this Agreement

was part of the judgment in this

t0 support the actions

is

trial court.

case.

Mueller

itself

and conditions

the terms

[sic]

made

Agreement 0f

a part hereof by

does not appear in the appellate

Missing portions of the record are presumed

V. Hill,

158 Idaho 208, 218, 345 P.3d 998, 1008

presumption, and the forgoing evidence in the record indicating what the

terms of the Agreement were, there

is

substantial evidence in the record

from which the

district

court could identify the terms of Gray’s probation.

The Wisconsin Agreement, including Term ST 00 1 was signed by Gray and admitted
,

evidence

at the evidentiary hearing.

agreement that
to, in part,

it is

(State’s Exhibit B.)

tied t0 Gray’s Idaho probation.

“[ﬂollow

all

It is

clear

into

from the language of the

Term SP 001 of the Agreement requires Gray

conditions of [the] Idaho Department of Corrections

[sic]

Standard

Agreement 0f Supervision.”

(Id., p.2.)

It is

Rules of Supervision, including of Term
supervision ended and Gray

0f the

Interstate

ST

was returned to

also clear that the alleged Violations of the Wisconsin

001,

was

the

mechanism by Which Gray’s Wisconsin

Idaho. (State’s Exhibit H.) Thus, even in the absence

Compact Agreement, which presumably

directly, the district court

tied these probation terms together

reasonably inferred the inescapable link between Gray’s Idaho probation

and the terms ofprobation he was subj ect t0 While present

in

Wisconsin? There

is

thus substantial

evidence that by Violating the Wisconsin Rules 0f Supervision, Gray also violated his Idaho
probation.

The
0fthe

2

state

acknowledges that the only evidentiary hearing exhibit3 indicating that the terms

IDOC Agreement 0f Supervision (including Claim

Further, the Interstate

Commission

12)

were a part of Gray’s Idaho probation

for Adult Offender Supervision Rules,

Which are binding on

the compacting states and have the force and effect of law, LC. § 20-301, Articles V, VIII; required
the sending state (Idaho), t0 “give the same force and effect to conditions imposed by a receiving

had been imposed by the sending state.” ICAOS Rule
4.103-1. The ICAOS Rules also provide that an offender Who is subject t0 a retaking by the
receiving state that may result in a probation revocation shall be afforded a probable cause hearing.
ICAOS Rule 5.108. Such a hearing was provided t0 Gray in Wisconsin (State’s Exhibit H),
indicating that he was subj ect t0 an Idaho probation revocation based upon his alleged Violation 0f
the Wisconsin Rules 0f Supervision.
state” (Wisconsin), “as if those conditions

3

While the

IDOC employee Who testiﬁed at the probation Violation evidentiary hearing stated that

he was generally aware of interstate compacts utilized in Idaho, he did not speciﬁcally identify the
terms 0f Gray’s Idaho probation from a source other than the Report of Violation.
6/18/19
Tn, p.14, L.5

—

(E

p.32, L.21.)

Supervision Rules quoted in

However, the employee did testify that the IDOC Agreement of
the Report 0f Violation were, “in [his] experience,” rules that “are a

part of our agreement of supervision.”

(Id.,

p.16, Ls.14-17.)

Additionally, while

it

was not

admitted into evidence at the evidentiary hearing, Gray’s judgment 0f conviction and probation
order stated that Gray
Supervision. (R., p.97.)

was

subject to the terms and conditions 0f the

IDOC Agreement

of

is

the State’s Report of Violation

itself.

This Report of Violation quotes from several terms of the

IDOC Agreement of Supervision, including Claim

12,

and

asserts that

Gray was

in Violation

of his

probation because he violated the language of these terms. (State’s Exhibit A.) This document
signed and sworn by a Senior Idaho ProbatiorﬂParole Ofﬁcer, and a Supervisor.

document

is

(Id.)

is

Thus, the

not far removed from sworn testimony of a probation ofﬁcer stating the terms 0f

Gray’s Idaho probation. Thus, there

is

substantial evidence that

by Violating the IDOC Agreement

0f Supervision, Gray also violated his Idaho probation.

A review of the
substantial evidence

exhibits submitted at the probation Violation evidentiary hearing reveals

from Which the

district court

could reasonable

infer,

preponderance 0f evidence, that Wisconsin Rule of Supervision ST 001 and

and conclude by a

IDOC Agreement

0f

Supervision Claim 12 and were required terms of Gray’s Idaho supervision, and that Gray violated
his Idaho probation

by

district court erred in

4

On

appeal,

Gray

Violating these terms.4 Therefore,

Gray has

failed to demonstrate that the

concluding that he violated his probation.

was insufﬁcient
was entered by the

also asserts that the evidence

violated a treatment-based term 0f probation that

placed him 0n probation. (Appellant’s brief, pp.16-20;

ﬂ alﬂ

to support a

ﬁnding

district court

When it

R., p.100.)

Gray asserts

that

he

initially

that these

terms of probation, entered before Gray was transferred t0 Wisconsin, were the only terms that

bound him

of the evidentiary omissions at the Idaho evidentiary hearing. (Appellant’s
brief, pp.16-20;
alﬂ R., pp.96-100.) Because the state only asserts that the district court did
not err in the ﬁndings it actually made — that Gray violated Term 12 of the IDOC Agreement of
Supervision and Term ST 001 0f the Wisconsin Rules of Supervision — it does not respond to this
in light

ﬂ

argument.

10

II.

Gray Has Failed T0 Show That He Lacked Adequate Notice Of The Alleged Violation Of The
Wisconsin Rules of Supervision
A.

Introduction

Gray contends

that the district court violated his constitutional

adequate notice 0f the state’s assertion that he violated Term
agreement.

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-13.)

The

Probation Violation did not specify this term, Gray

state

still

due process right

ST 001 of the Wisconsin

to receive

Supervision

submits that While Idaho’s Report 0f

received adequate notice under the unique

circumstances of this case: (1) through the prior Wisconsin ﬁnding 0f probable cause that Gray
violated

Term ST 001; and

(2)

because the

ﬁnding 0f a probation Violation was

district court’s

based upon the same factual allegations that underlined the Wisconsin ﬁnding.

B.

Standard

Of Review

Questions of whether constitutional requirements have been satisﬁed are subject t0 free
review. Rose, 144 Idaho at 765, 171 P.3d at 256.

C.

GraV Received Adequate Of The Violated Term Of The Wisconsin Probation Agreement

The

constitutional right to procedural

adequate notice of the claimed Violation.
258, 261-262 (2012) (citing Morrissev

V.

due process in a probation Violation hearing includes

State V. Scraggins, 153 Idaho 867, 870-871,

Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 489 (1972)).

revoking probation for a term of Which the defendant had n0 notice
process. State

V.

Prelwitz, 132 Idaho 191, 968 P.2d 1100 (Ct.

412 U.S. 430 (1973)).

To support a due process claim,
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is

App. 1998)

it is

292 P.3d

Manifestly,

not consistent with due

(citing

Douglas

V.

Buder,

incumbent upon a defendant

t0

afﬁrmatively show actual prejudice and the effective of that prejudice upon his 0r her ability t0
present a defense.

State V.

Mugphy, 99 Idaho 511, 515, 584 P.2d 1236, 1240 (1978); State

Averett, 142 Idaho 879, 885, 136 P.3d 350,

356

(Ct.

be deﬁnite and not speculative. Mugphy, 99 Idaho
885, 136 P.3d at 356.

particular situation

Due

V.

App. 2006). The proof 0f this prejudice must

at 5 15,

584 P.2d

at

1240; Averett, 142 Idaho at

process “is ﬂexible and calls for such procedural protections as the

demands.” Morrissey, 408 U.S.

at

481.

Here, one of the two terms of probation that the district court found Gray in Violation of

was Term ST 001 OfWisconsin Rules of Supervision.
Rules 0f Supervision were admitted into evidence

(6/1 8/19 Tr., p.44,

L.23 — p.45, L.16.) These

at the evidentiary hearing.

(State’s Exhibit B.)

As Gray correctly notes on appeal, this was not one of the terms ofprobation included in the Report
0f Violation ﬁled by the State 0f Idaho Which

initiated the probation Violation proceeding.

State’s Exhibit A.)

Gray asserted a lack 0f adequate notice

L22 —

However, the

p.41, L.8.)

state

(E

t0 the district court. (6/1 8/19 Tn, p.39,

submits that in the circumstances of this case, Gray was

provided adequate notice of the relevant probation term for two reasons.
First, as the state

argued t0 the

district court

(6/18/19 Tn, p.34, Ls.15-24), Wisconsin

provided Gray a “Notice of Interstate Compact Probable Cause Hearing,” which alleged Violations

0f the Wisconsin Rules of Supervision. (State’s Exhibit H.) Speciﬁcally, in

this notice,

Gray was

informed that as a result of his attempts t0 procure a ﬁrearm, his Wisconsin probation ofﬁcer was
asserting that

Gray was

in Violation

of Terms

Supervision, and that his probation ofﬁcer had

retaking.

(Id.)

A probable

ST 001 and ST 003 of
made

the Wisconsin Rules of

a request t0 the State of Idaho for Gray’s

cause hearing was hearing was subsequently conducted.
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(State’s

Exhibit

F.)

Statements from Gray and the probation ofﬁcer were submitted

at the hearing, at the

conclusion of which, probable cause for the alleged probation Violations were found.
R., p.112.)

(1d,;

ﬂ

211$

Second, While the State 0f Idaho’s subsequently—ﬁled report 0f probation Violation

alleged the Violation of a different term 0f probation (a term contained in the

Supervision),

was based upon

it

IDOC Agreement of

the precise factual allegations set forth in Wisconsin.

(State’s

Exhibit A.)

Under these circumstances, Gray received adequate notice of the

was informed of the
for a Violation

facts,

asserted Violation.

factual allegations against him, received a hearing at

Gray

Which probable cause

of Term ST 001 0f the Wisconsin Rules 0f Supervision was found based upon these

received an Idaho evidentiary hearing at which the same alleged facts that were set forth in

Wisconsin were submitted again, and then was found
of the Wisconsin Rules of Supervision that was

t0

be in Violation 0f the same Term ST 001

at issue in the

Wisconsin probable cause hearing.

Further, in light 0f the fact that the district court’s determination

screen shots of text messages sent

imagine

p.44, L.23

largely based

— p.45,

L.16),

upon submitted
it is

difﬁcult t0

how Gray’s preparation of the for the Idaho evidentiary hearing would have been different

had he been charged
prejudice.

harmless.

deemed

by Gray (6/18/19 Tn,

was

(E

E

differently in the Idaho Report ofViolation.

generally 6/1 8/19 Tr.)

Arizona

V.

For

this reason,

Gray himself asserted no speciﬁc

any due process Violation was also

Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 306 (1991) (Constitutional error

harmless).
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may

be

Gray received adequate notice of district
the Wisconsin Rules 0f Supervision.

court’s

Gray has therefore

ﬁnding

that

he violated Term ST 001 0f

failed t0 demonstrate that the district court

violated his constitutional due process rights.

III.

A Review Of The Record Demonstrates That Gray’s Probation Violations Were “Willful” As
Required
A.

BV I.C.R. 33m

Introduction

Gray contends
expressly

ﬁnd

that the district court erroneously

that the Violations

revoked his probation because

were “willful” as required by I.C.R.

pp.20-23.) This Court should not consider this assertion because

appeal.

In any event, While

Gray

is

33(f).

Gray raises

correct that the district court failed t0

it

it

failed to

(Appellant’s brief,

for the ﬁrst time in

make such an

express

ﬁnding, neither I.C.R. 33(f) nor the caselaw interpreting that rule preclude an appellate court from

upholding an implicit court ﬁnding that
evidence supports the

is

supported by substantial evidence.

district court’s implicit

Here, substantial

ﬁndings that Gray’s probation Violations were

willful.

B.

Standard

Where

Of Review

the

trial court's

decision turns

appellate courts exercise free review. State

The decision Whether

t0

V.

upon

the interpretation of an Idaho Criminal Rule,

Weber, 140 Idaho 89, 91-92, 90 P.3d 3 14, 317 (2004).

revoke a defendant’s probation for a Violation

discretion of the district court. Knutsen, 138 Idaho at 923, 71 P.3d at 1070.
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is

Within the

Gray’s Probation Violations Were Willful

C.

First, the state asserts that

erred

by

failing to

make an

Gray has

failed to preserve his assertion that the district court

express ﬁnding that the probation Violations were willful before

revoking Gray’s probation. Below, Gray did not raise the theory that his Violations were not willful
0r ask the district court for a speciﬁc ﬁnding
6/ 1 8/ 19 Tr.) “Issues not raised

will be held t0 the theory

on Whether

his Violation

was

willful.

(ﬂ generally

below Will not be considered by this court on appeal, and the parties

upon which

the case

was presented

t0 the

lower court.” State

Garcia-

V.

Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275, 396 P.3d 700, 704 (2017).5

However, even

if properly raised

on appeal, Gray’s contention

fails.

Idaho Criminal Rule

33(f) provides, in relevant part:

The court must not revoke probation unless

an admission by the defendant
0r a ﬁnding by the court, following a hearing, that the defendant willfully violated
a condition 0f probation.
In State

V.

there

is

Garner, 161 Idaho 708, 71 1-712, 390 P.3d 434, 437-438 (2017), the Idaho

Supreme Court held

that the requirement that a court

must ﬁnd

willful before revoking the probation did not conﬂict With

found that there was substantial and competent evidence

ﬁnding

in that case that Garner’s probations Violations

that a probation Violation

any Idaho

statute.

The Court then

to support the district court’s express

were

willful.

Li. at 712,

390 P.3d

In Garner, the Court did not hold that the required court ﬁnding 0f willfulness

5

The

was

at

438.

must be

acknowledges that in State V. Clausen, 163 Idaho 180, 182, 408 P.3d 935, 937 (Ct. App.
oprpeals reviewed Clausen’s assertion that the district court erred by
failing to make an express ﬁnding 0f willfulness before revoking probation under the abuse of
discretion standard, rather than, as the state requested, as an unpreserved assertion 0f error.
state

2017), the Idaho Court
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expressly made. The Court therefore did not overrule well-established precedent indicating that

E

the absence 0f such an express factual ﬁnding does not necessarily demonstrate court error.

State V. Peterson, 123 Idaho 49, 51,

844 P.2d 31, 33

(Ct.

App. 1992) (noting the

“implicitly determined that Peterson’s disregard of the reporting obligation

was

willful”);

Kirkwood, 111 Idaho 623, 625, 726 P.2d 735, 737 (1986) (“The implicit ﬁndings of the
(i.e.,

that statements

m

district court

trial court,

0f the defendant made to the police were voluntary and should not be

suppressed) should be overturned only if not supported

by substantial

evidence.”); State

131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (Ct. App. 1998) (“[A]ny implicit ﬁndings of the

DuValt,

V.

court

trial

supported by substantial evidence should be given due deference.”).
In State

V.

Clausen, 163 Idaho 180, 183, 408 P.3d 935, 938 (Ct. App. 2017), the district

court revoked Clausen’s probation Without

simply reverse the

84,

408 P.3d

at

revocation order based upon this omission, the Court

district court’s

reviewed the underlying

facts t0

making an express ﬁnding of willfulness. Rather than

determine whether such a ﬁnding could be inferred. Li.

The Court ultimately concluded, “[b]ecause

938-39.

oprpeals
at

183-

the district court revoked

Clausen’s probation Without making an express ﬁnding of willfulness, and because there

is

not

sufﬁcient evidence in the record from which willfulness could be inferred, the district court abused

its

discretion.” Li. at 184,

408 P.3d

at 939.

On appeal, Gray does not contend that the record in this case lacks
which the willfulness of
assertion that an express

his probation Violations can

ﬁnding

is

sufﬁcient evidence from

be inferred — instead, he

mandatory. (Appellant’s

brief,

relies

upon an

pp.2 1 -23.) Because n0 appellate

court has so held, and because of the contrary authority noted above, the state contends that an
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appellate court may, as the Court of Appeals did in Clausen, review the record for substantial

evidence where n0 express ﬁnding

The

state further

is

submits that

made.
if

such a review

is

made

here, substantial evidence supports

an implicit ﬁnding of willfulness. As indicated above in the Statement of Facts and Course of
Proceedings, Gray’s probation Violations were plainly not of the sort where his Willﬁllness was
issue

— both were based upon Gray’s own

Corrections’ decision to notify Idaho that

overt actions leading t0 the Wisconsin Department of

it

would no longer supervise Gray. Speciﬁcally, Gray

was removed from a treatment program based upon
receptionist

and

at

his hostile behavior directed towards a

failure to adequately participate in treatment (State’s Exhibit C);

and then

later

threatened an individual at his workplace with Violence before he attempted to procure a ﬁrearm

(State’s Exhibits

were
V.

willful,

D,

E). Additionally,

any error 0f the

because the record reﬂects that Gray’s probation Violations

district court in failing to articulate

Lopez, 141 Idaho 575, 578, 114 P.3d 133, 136

reasonable doubt,

A review
ﬁnding

it is

(Ct.

such a ﬁnding

App. 2005) (Error

is

is

harmless.

harmless

beyond a

not prejudicial.)

of the record reveals substantial evidence supporting an implicit

that Gray’s probation Violations

that the district court

if,

m

abused

its

were

willful.

Gray has therefore

discretion in revoking his probation.

17

district court

failed to demonstrate

IV.

Gray Has Failed T0 Show That The District Court Erred In Concluding That Due Process Did
Not Require Him T0 Be Provided The Opportunity To Cross—Examine Witnesses From
Wisconsin In Light Of Good Cause Set Forth BV The State
A.

Introduction

Gray contends

that the district court violated his constitutional

due process rights by

permitting the state to introduce hearsay evidence from Wisconsin witnesses t0 support

allegations that

Gray violated

court properly: (1)

would have had
his

made an afﬁrmative

to travel

—

Standard

factual

rights.

However, the

district

ﬁnding 0f good cause — the distance such Witnesses

in permitting the evidence;

due process confrontation

B.

his probation. (Appellant’s brief, pp.24-28.)

its

and

Gray has therefore

(2) correctly

failed t0

show

found that Gray waived

error.

Of Review

On review

of a

trial

Will be upheld if supported

765, 171 P.3d at 256.

court’s decision t0 revoke probation, the trial court’s factual ﬁndings

by

substantial evidence

and not clearly erroneous. Rose, 144 Idaho

at

However, questions 0f whether constitutional requirement have been

satisﬁed are subject to free review. Li.

The

C.

District

Court Properly Found

Good Cause For The Admission Of The Hearsay

Testimony
Parolees and probationers d0 not enjoy the full panoply of constitutional protections
afforded criminal defendants. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480; Scraggins, 153 Idaho at 871, 292 P.3d

at

262;

ﬂ

also

Gagnon

V. Scarpelli,

not a criminal prosecution.

411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973).

Gagyon, 411 U.S.

at

18

782.

State V.

A motion to revoke probation is
Crowe, 131 Idaho 109, 112, 952

Consequently, the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause, which

P.2d 1245, 1248 (1998).

grants t0 criminal defendants the right t0 confront adverse Witnesses,

probationers. United States

at 480).

V.

Hall,

419 F.3d 980, 985

2005) (citing Morrissey, 408 U.S.

Likewise, the Idaho Rules of Evidence, including the rule against hearsay, do not apply

t0 probation revocation proceedings.

812 P.2d 741, 742

n.

1

I.R.E. 101(c)(3); State V. Tracy, 119 Idaho 1027,

liberty interest in continuing probation,

therefore entitled t0 due process before probation

at 123; Ke_lsey,

Court established

may be revoked.

minimum due process requirements
408 U.S.

Morrissey t0 probationers).

at

488-489;

among

Included

examine adverse witnesses unless the

m,

133 Idaho

at

ﬂ

these

district court

is

for parole revocation proceedings
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m,

411 U.S.

at

243, 985

(9th Cir.

under the

speciﬁcally ﬁnds good cause for not allowing
Therefore, although a

trial.

Li;

ﬂ

also United States

V.

it

is

not

Martin, 984

1993).

In analyzing Whether the defendant’s due process right t0 confrontation

employ a process 0f balancing

proffered good cause for denying

App. 1988)

is

a due process “right t0 confront and cross-

Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 (parenthesis omitted).)

equivalent to that afforded a criminal defendant at

courts

and

782 (applying

defendant in a probation revocation proceeding has the right to confront witnesses,

F.2d 308, 310

n. 1,

115 Idaho at 314, 766 P.2d at 784. In Morrissey, the United States Supreme

Fourteenth Amendment.

confrontation.”

1028

(1991).

However, a probationer has a protected

P.2d

(9th Cir.

does not apply t0

(citations omitted).

it.

was

violated,

the defendant’s right to confrontation against the state’s

State V. Farmer, 131 Idaho 803, 807,

In evaluating

good cause, courts 100k
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t0

964 P.2d 670, 674

(Ct.

both the “difﬁculty and

expense of procuring witnesses, Gagnon, 411 U.S.
[United States

V.

Simmons, 812 F.2d 561, 564

782

at

(9th Cir.

n.5,

and the

1987)].”

reliability

Li.

On

0f the evidence,

the other side of the

balancing process, the court should weigh the defendant’s right t0 confrontation under the speciﬁc

circumstances presented in that case. Li. (citing United States
Cir.

1993));

ﬂ

also United States V. Bell,

balancing test and noting that “[a]s
rules

true

0n what the government must show

At

Violations through

However, the

was an

785 F.2d 640, 642-643

of any balancing

test, is

(8th Cir.

(9th

1986) (discussing

not possible t0 articulate ﬁxed

‘good cause’ in every case.”)

t0 establish

Gray

intention t0 submit the factual accounts of Gray’s alleged probation

its

documents prepared by Wisconsin witnesses.

state asserted

interstate

constitute

Martin, 984 F.2d 308, 310

the start of the evidentiary hearing, the state acknowledged the potential due process

question involved with

(Id.)

is

V.

good cause

compact case

in

for submitting evidence in this matter

and argued

that the witnesses’ presence in

that the hearsay statements lacked veracity.

Ls.10-25.)

Tr., p.6,

—

the fact that this

Which the supervising probation ofﬁcer was based

obj ected to the evidence

good cause, and

(6/18/19

in Wisconsin.

Wisconsin did not

(Id., p.7,

L.25

-

p.9, L. 1 5;

p.42, Ls.1-23.)

The

district court

overruled the objection

(Id.,

p.10, L.8

—

p.11, L.19),

and then,

after the

evidence was submitted, expressly found that the Witnesses’ presence in Wisconsin, and the
“distance between the states,” constituted

L. 1 3).

good cause t0 permit the evidence

p.43, L.25

— p.44,

Among the purposes of the Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision compact

agreement are t0 “encourage[]...cooperative
crime,

(id.,

7,

‘6

t0 provide the

framework

for the

efforts

and mutual assistance

in the prevention

of

promotion 0f public safety and protect the rights of

20

Victims through the control and regulation of the interstate

community,” and
offenders

by

movement of

t0 “provide for the effective tracking, supervision,

the sending and receiving states.”

LC.

§ 20-301.

offenders through the

and rehabilitation of these

Indeed, in this case, transfer t0

Wisconsin was beneﬁcial for Gray in that that was where his family resided, including his mother,

Who was

active in supporting

Gray

in his rehabilitative efforts.

(E R., pp.91-92.)

Gray resided

with his mother in Wisconsin until the incidents underlying his probation Violations occurred.
(State’s Exhibit G, p.2.)

It

would

frustrate the goals

of interstate compact agreements

if the state

was required to obtain the evidentiary hearing presence of out-of—state Witnesses t0 prove probation
Violations.

Therefore, the state asserts, such distance between states as between Idaho and

Wisconsin generally weighs in favor of a ﬁnding of good cause
testimony.

E

United States

V.

t0 forgo

such live witness

Harrison, 809 F.3d 420, 423 (8th Cir. 2015) (in conducting

balancing test t0 permit hearsay evidentiary hearing evidence, ﬁnding that though the government
did not expressly offer an explanation for not producing live testimony of out—of—state probation

ofﬁcers,

it

was “apparent from

the record, however, that the live testimony of these Witnesses

would have been unreasonably burdensome,
difference they

would have been required

impractical,

t0 travel.”);

and costly given the considerable

ﬂ alﬂ

Bill,

785 F.2d

at

644 (noting

that

considerable expense to secure the personal appearance 0f Kansas ofﬁcers at an Arkansas

revocation hearing weighed in favor of ﬁnding good cause not to require appearance, though
declining to reach the issue).

In light of this

showing of good cause, the submitted exhibits were adequately

support the district court’s ﬁnding that Gray violated his probation.
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The

reliable to

state submitted: (1)

an

email sent from a licensed counselor

at the

treatment program Gray

was removed from

t0 Gray’s

probation ofﬁcer, quoting from the counselor’s notes which documented the incident with Gray

and the

receptionist; (2) an email

from the individual

at

Gray’s place of employment

Whom

Gray

threatened; (3) images of text messages depicting Gray’s attempts t0 obtain a ﬁrearm; (4) a written

statement from Gray’s mother corroborating that the text messages were sent by Gray t0 his

sister,

and providing additional information about Gray’s struggles While on probation; and (5) Wisconsin
probation documents summarizing the evidence set forth at the hearing t0 determine whether

probable cause existed for Gray’s probation Violations. (State’s Exhibits C, D, E,

F,

G.)

The

state

submits that this evidence, generated by the individual responsible for supervising Gray’s
probation in Wisconsin, was adequately reliable t0 support the district court’s conclusion that good

cause existed to admit the evidence.

The
(6/18/19

Tr.,

district court also

p.10, L.16

— p.11,

found that Gray waived his due process confrontation
L.19; p.43, L.25

evidence of this waiver in the record

IDOC Agreement

is

— p.44,

found in the

0f Supervision paragraph

14,

L.11.)

state’s

Which

As Gray notes on

appeal, the only

Report ofViolation, which quotes from
in turn provides that, “[i]f allowed to

transfer supervision t0 another district court state, the defendant agrees to accept

allegation

rights.

any Violation

documents purportedly submitted by the agency/ofﬁcer supervising the defendant

receiving district 0r state as admissible into evidence as credible and reliable.

in the

The defendant

waives any right to confront the author of such documents.” (State’s Exhibit A.) As further noted

by both Gray and
in the record,

the state

on appeal, the

and was not submitted

IDOC Agreement

of Supervision

itself

into evidence at the evidentiary hearing.
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does not appear

However, as noted

above, the Agreement was incorporated by reference into Gray’s judgment 0f conviction.
p.97.)

Missing portions 0f the record are presumed t0 support the actions of the

MLller, 158 Idaho
the waiver found

The

at

by the

district court

and quoted in the

state’s

Report 0f Violation.

properly found that good cause existed t0 permit the state t0 present

hearsay evidence supporting
his

trial court.

218, 345 P.3d at 1008. Therefore, this Court can presume the existence 0f

district court

Gray waived

(R.,

its

allegations that

due process confrontation

Gray violated

rights.

his probation.

Gray has therefore

In the alternative,

failed to demonstrate that

the district court erred in permitting the evidence.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests that this

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s

Gray’s probation.

DATED this

6th

day of July, 2020.

/s/

Mark W. Olson

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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order revoking
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Mark W. Olson
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